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Rate Base Evaluation and Vertical Integration:
Shifting Standards in Telephone Regulation
JAMES MCCONNAUGHEY* &
MANLEY R. IRWIN**
The nation's investment in telephone equipment now exceeds 100
billion dollars. That the purchase of telephone equipment resides as a
prerogative of management is obvious. Such investment decisions reflect
management's view of variables ranging from price to operating costs,
from payback to equipment obsolescence.
Investment decisions, on the other hand, are not without their impact
upon the subscribing public. Exorbitant equipment costs can translate
into exorbitant rates. Inadequate features can translate into inadequate
service. Little wonder that regulatory authorities have searched for in-
vestment guidelines that give some assurance to consumers that
telephone rates are just and reasonable. And little wonder that the search
for accountability has been laden with disagreement, controversy, and
uncertainty.
This paper focuses on the regulatory search for rate base evaluation.
The concentration will be on the problems posed by a vertically in-
tegrated market structure as that structure impacts the procurement
and the valuation of telephone plant. To this end, an attempt will be
made to
" survey the vertical structure of the telephone industry
" trace the legacy of equipment price comparison studies supplied by
telephone companies
" explain the demise of price comparison studies at the Federal level
" identify a recent trend toward competitive access to the telephone
equipment market.
The conclusion which flows from this analysis is that equipment price
comparisons, long an acceptable standard for rate base evaluation pur-
poses, have been rejected by the Federal Communications Commission.
What remains uncertain is whether such a standard will continue to be
employed for telephone regulation at the state level. If acceptance of com-
pany supplied price comparisons persists in the future as it has in the
past, then both the FCC and the states will find themselves in basic con-
flict over a fundamental issue in U.S. telecommunications-the pricing
and securing of equipment that accounts for some 10% of U.S. gross
private domestic investment.
*Economist, Federal Communications Commission. The views expressed are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission.
**Professor of Business and Economics, Whitmore School of Business and Economics,
University of New Hampshire.
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STRUCTURE OF THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY
The four largest telephone utilities in this country are holding com-
panies and, by themselves, account for roughly 95% of the industry's
telephones in service.' The American Telephone & Telegraph Co. - the
Bell System - singly claims over 80% of domestic telephones, total
plant, and operating revenue (toll, local, and total) and also dominates in
comparisons of net income, stockholders equity, and employment.2 In
1976, Bell's construction expenditures exceeded ten billion dollars, three
fourths of the industry's total outlays for new plant.3 The Bell System's
manufacturing and supply arm, Western Electric, registered sales of
almost seven billion dollars in 1976. 4 The bulk of those equipment pur-
chases was secured by operating telephone companies owned and con-
trolled by AT&T.'
The remaining 1590 telephone companies in the U.S. consist of non-Bell
or independent utilities. Many are controlled by integrated holding com-
panies which provide the majority of telephones in this sector. 6 General
Telephone and Electronics (GTE), the Bell of the independent market,
fits this mold, as do United Telecommunications and Continental
Telephone, the other major telephone systems among the independents.
These holding companies together account for the most significant por-
tion of the independent market's total operating revenues in the U.S.7
Each has at least one manufacturing affiliate as well as a number of
operating telephone companies in their respective folds. In short, a
familial utility-supplier relationship dominates the structure of U.S.
telecommunications.
The Canadian telephone market parallels that of the United States.
British Columbia (BC) Telephone Company in the western part of the
country and Bell Canada in the east, are both vertically integrated. The
associated manufacturing suppliers of each company together account
for the greatest portion of telecommunications equipment sold in
Canada. Northern Telecom, Ltd., owned by Bell Canada, currently pro-
vides over 70% of equipment sales in Canada, while GTE's affiliates ac-
count for considerably less.8 But it is clear that the integrated suppliers
provide the bulk of equipment to Canadian telephone companies.
'American Tel. and Tel. Co., 64 F.C.C. 2d 131, 145 (1976).
2United Sates Independent Telephone Association (hereinafter cited as USITA), In-
dependent Phonefacts '77, 10, FORTUNE. July 1977, at 172-173.3USITA, supra note 2, at 10.
'FORTUNE. August 1977, at 240.
5American Tel. and Tel. Co., 64 F.C.C. 2d 131, 159 (1976).
IUSITA, HOLDING COMPANY REPORT, May 1973; TELEPHONE ENGINEER & MANAGEMENT,
October 1, 1973, at 130-32.7USITA, supra note 6; FORTUNE. supra note 4.
8
DIRECTOR OF INVESTIGATION AND RESEARCH, COMBINES INVESTIGATION ACT. THE EF-
FECTS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION ON THE TELECOMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT MARKET IN
CANADA, n. 1 (1976).
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Economic theory argues that market structure begets market conduct.
To the extent the integrated telephone utility purchases the bulk of its
equipment needs from the supply affiliate, its investment rate base
emanates virtually from within. The associated manufacturer's equip-
ment prices by and large translate into the utility's rate base valuation as
the buying process becomes continuous and habitual.
The question persists of what assures the subscriber that in the
absence of competitive bidding, equipment prices generated through in-
ternal corporate transactions are just and reasonable? The answer to this
question has taken the form of studies that match the integrated sup-
plier's equipment price with the price of independent suppliers. AT&T's
price comparison studies, for example, balance Western Electric's prices
against comparable products of competing suppliers. Likewise, General
Telephone studies compare equipment prices of its affiliates with those of
general trade suppliers. Similarly, Bell Canada submits studies
comparing its affiliate prices with those of the general trade supplier. All
studies reach the same conclusion: the integrated supplier's prices, on
average, are less than those posted by independent manufacturers.
Hence, in-house purchases of equipment redound to the benefit of the
rate paying public.
In the U.S., AT&T's studies of Western Electric's prices stand as a
classic illustration of price comparisons. In the 1960's, for example, a
Bell-financed McKinsey study observed that Western Electric's prices
were, in general, significantly below the lowest prices offered by other
manufacturers of comparable equipment.9
More specifically, Western's prices were claimed to be less expensive in
virtually all of the major product lines 0
* 37% lower for PBXs," transmision equipment, and central offices
* 52% lower for telephone apparatus
* 47% lower for telephone sets
* 48% lower for exchange cable and toll cable
* 26% lower for outside plant 12
* 37% lower for installation of central offices. 13
In an update of the study (covering the period 1968 to 1972), McKinsey
reported that, based on AT&T studies, "Western Electric has, in general,
been able to sell its product to the Bell Telephone Companies at substan-
tially lower prices than could be achieved by buying from other
'McKINSEY & COMPANY, A STUDY OF WESTERN ELECTRIC'S PERFORMANCE, 2-13, 2-17
passim (1968).
'Id, Charts 2-15, 2-17, 4-13.
"A "PBX", or Private Branch Exchange, is a private telephone switchboard or a small,
private central office (manual or dial).
""Outside Plant" is telephone equipment, such as poles, conduits, cables, and wires,
which is out-of-doors, not in buildings.
'3A "central office" is a site where the switching of telephone calls is accomplished.
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sources.''14 During a major investigation of Bell System corporate inter-
relationships and vertical integration conducted by the FCC during the
first half of the 1970's a Bell witnes claimed that "for the range of pro-
ducts assigned to the interstate plant, Western Electric's Bell prices are,
overall, about 70 percent of the level of those currently representing the
lowest prices of general trade suppliers." 15
The thrust of these studies has been clear and compelling Telephone
utilities buy from their in-house suppliers because of lower prices and bet-
ter equipment. In-house procurement, so the argument follows,
translates into lower rates for the telephone subscriber. Company-
supplied price comparison studies, in short, give eloquent testimony to
economies arising out of a structure of vertical integration.
The logical implications of such price comparison analyses, however in-
viting, have never been explored thoroughly. No federal or state
regulatory agency, for example, has mandated a consolidation of equip-
ment manufacturers on grounds of economic efficiency. Nor have
regulatory agencies sorted out which telephone company study is valid
and which is invalid. Despite these problems, price comparisons have per-
sisted as a traditional institution for regulatory purposes at both federal
and state levels. Indeed, such studies have become institutionalized in
regulatory proceedings for the past fifty years. What, then, are the
origins of this institution and how has it evolved over time?
THE LEGACY OF PRICE COMPARISONS
It is fair to say that the federal courts first sanctioned price comparison
studies offered by telephone utilities. In a most critical case, Houston v.
Southwestern Bell,1 6 the Supreme Court held in 1922 that the burden of
justifying sole source procurement rested with the telephone company.
That burden legitimized AT&T's price comparisons of Western Electric
equipment versus outside equipment suppliers. This regulatory burden
was further extended in 1930 when in Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone,17
the Supreme Court insisted that Bell establish the reasonableness of
Western Electric profits as well as prices. On remand, the district court
found that Western Electric's prices were "lower than prices charged by
other manufacturers for comparable materials and also lower than the
prices charged by Western to independent telephone companies and
others for the same materials. 1' 8 In 1934 Congress created a new federal
regulatory agency, the Federal Communications Commission. In-
evitably, the FCC inherited court-established price comparisons and in-
"FCC Docket No. 19129, Phase II, Testimony of Frederick W. Gluck (Bell Exhibit 40) at
8.
'
5I, Testimony of Richard M. Wolf (Bell Exhibit 35), at 22.
16Houston v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 259 U.S. 318, 323 (1922).
"Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133 (1930).
"Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Gilbert et al., 3 F. Supp. 595, 598 (N.D. Ill. 1933).
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evitably, the FCC found itself examining the validity of Bell's equipment
studies.
The FCC has wrestled with AT&T's price comparison studies on three
occasions; a first occurred in the 1930's, a second in the 1960's, and the
third occurred in the 1970's. The Commission under prodding from Con-
gress in the 1930's conducted an investigation into the Bell-Western
Electric relationship.19 The Commission examined AT&T's price surveys
of Western and non-Western equipment and, in fact, undertook its own
price comparison studies. Although the FCC asserted that for some
assembled products the Bell System manufacturer's prices were higher
than those of the general trade suppliers, the Commission nevertheless
concluded by rejecting the validity of price comparisons as a meaningful
regulatory tool. 0 The Commission argued:
The differences in manufacturing and marketing conditions
between Western and the independent manufacturers are such
as to make a comparison of their respective prices of little
value in testing the reasonableness of Western's prices. Some
of these differences are: 1) the size of the market supplied by
Western as compared with that supplied by the independents;
2) the advance information available to Western as to the an-
ticipated purchases by its customers as compared with lack of
such information available to the independent manufacturers;
3) the cost of selling products of the independent companies as
compared with the fact that no sales cost is incurred by
Western; 4) the relative credit risks of the independent
manufacturers and Western.21
In rejecting Bell's price comparison studies, the FCC recommended an
amendment to the 1934 Communications Act which allowed Commission
prescription of cost accounting methods for manufacturing affiliates of
regulated carriers. 22 That amendment was not adopted, however, and the
FCC thus pursued a policy of continual surveillance of the Bell System.
In effect, Bell's price comparison studies remained as an appendage to
regulatory review.
Price comparisons were not seriously challenged again at the federal
level until a private line rate case erupted in the late 1960's.23 Again Bell
submitted its studies of Western Electric equipment and again the Com-
mission rejected the premise of such price comparisons. Indeed, the Com-
mission stated:
We think the record is clear that this comparability has not
been shown. Western's type of operation, the unique condi-
19FCC, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED
STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 340, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
201d at 309-23.
"Id. at 323.
2 Id. at 600-01.
"American Tel. and Tel. Co., 34 F.C.C. 217 (1963).
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tions under which it operates, and its corporate affiliations are
important factors to be considered in comparing it with other
companies. There must be a common denominator for the com-
panies involved in the comparison. Our review of the record
fails to disclose one. Accordingly, we find and conclude that
the telephone companies' presentation is not adequate proof of
the reasonableness of Western's prices and profits with
respect to its sales of equipment, services, and supplies to the
related operating telephone companies.2 4
Of course, the acid test is whether equipment prices were disallowed from
the carrier's rate base. They were not. Thus, although the FCC
repudiated AT&T's price comparison studies, the Commission did not
propose an alternative for evaluating the reasonableness of vertical tran-
sactions.
A third and most recent examination of the price comparisons occurred
in the 1970's. An AT&T interstate rate case was conducted by the FCC
as an investigation into the reasonableness of investment procurement
and particularly the reasonableness of Western Electric's prices and pro-
fits. 5 Bell submitted its price comparison surveys with the appropriate
witnesses, and testimony.
In this case the Commission's final decision represents, to date, the
most critical evaluation of the price comparisons employed to measure
the prudence of in-house equipment procurement. In essence, the FCC
concluded that the price comparison studies were inappropriate,
unfair, and invalid. In fact, the Commission departed from earlier in-
quiries by citing the virtues of competitive access to a closed
Bell/Western Electric market and ordering AT&T to propose a new pur-
chasing arrangement which would ensure greater telephone company
autonomy in equipment procurement. 26 A Bell-submitted proposal is cur-
rently under study by the Commission.
In and of itself, the most recent development concerning price com-
parisons at the federal level appears uneventful. Yet it is part of a long
and continuous trend, a trend that spells the demise of a court-sanctioned
institution and the decline of price comparisons as compelling evidence
for investment rate base evaluation. Not only did the Commission deny
the validity of equipment price comparisons, but the FCC ordered the
Bell System to develop an alternative means of securing greater com-
petitive access to its equipment needs. The Commission, in short, turned
back a judicial legacy that dates to the 1920's.
The intriguing question remains: Why has the institution of price com-
parison studies-for 50 years held to be part of the regulatory pro-
cess-experienced a decline at the federal level?
2Id. at 225.
"
5 American Tel. and Tel. Co., 64 F.C.C. 2d 1 (1977).
2
61d at pp. 47-52, 143-44, 149, passim.
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REASONS FOR THE PRICE COMPARISON DEMISE
Despite its long life, five factors have tended to erode the validity and
persuasiveness of price comparison studies: Rapid technological change;
equipment competition; barriers to competitive entry; methodological in-
firmities; AT&T's license contract.
Rapid Technological Change
It is almost a cliche to observe that the telephone company is in a state
of dynamic change. Telecommunications is electronics, and electronics is
in the throes of rapid innovation. Telecommunications no longer includes
only analog electro-mechanical switching, transmission, terminal, and
related apparatus. Rather, telecommunications is moving into the world
of digital switching, digital transmission, digital terminals. Telephone
plant now embraces integrated circuit chips with memory and logic
capability, fiber optics, new memory units, earth satellite stations, and
computers for routing, storing, and processing information. This change
has tended to erode the concept of an instant, paper snapshot of equip-
ment prices as a test of reasonableness.
Equipment Competition
Second, telecommunications has experienced not merely the entry of
new firms but entry of diverse industries into telephone equipment.
These industries include the mainframe computer industry, micro-
computers, mini-computers, peripherals, software industry, aerospace in-
dustry, the integrated circuit (IC) chip industry, fiber optics, to mention a
few. Joining incumbent and traditional telephone carriers, these in-
dustries manufacture equipment or supply service to the general public.
In short, telecommunications technologically has extended beyond the
vertical laboratories and suppliers of traditional carriers.
Accelerated technology has clearly encouraged entry in the telecom-
munications equipment market. New products offered by new firms spon-
soring new technology have penetrated the constituent components of
the telephone investment including terminal apparatus, local loops,
various levels of switching gear, and local transmission. In every invest-
ment building block of the telephone industry, technology has provided
product alternatives which yield lower costs and enhanced service
possibilities.
In fact, the FCC's recent investigation found that new suppliers were
able to penetrate vertical integration despite the ownership bond of cap-
tive suppliers and utility owners.2 7 This entry took place because the in-
271j, Statement and Recommendations of the* Common Carrier Bureau's Trial Staff,
("Statement of the Trial Staff'), Feb. 2, 1976, esp. pp. 4-5, 34-98; Final Decision, esp.ipp.
35-37, 55-56, 143; fn. 42-46; Appendices A and B.
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cumbent carriers experienced product gaps, product voids, or simply non-
existent hardware. To that extent, fragile competition challenged the
economic performance of vertical suppliers, specifically Western Electric.
That the integrated affiliate responded to the competitive changes was
equally obvious. Western Electric in particular commenced a broad
evaluation of its products, its prices, its costs, and its equipment
features. Specifically,
- Western Electric dropped old products as obsolete
- Western Electric brought out new products at lower cost
- Western Electric embarked on a cost reduction program for
products exposed to competition
- Western Electric enhanced and introduced new features to
its various business subscriber equipment
- Western Electric's R&D by-passed Bell Laboratories to ex-
pedite competitive innovation
- Research and development was restructured and quickened
in terms of its priorities
- Delivery time was expedited in cases of market competition
- Western Electric augmented its marketing activities. 28
These activities posed a series of questions. If vertical integration was
efficient and innovative, why the need to re-evaluate, re-assess, and
change product prices, cost, innovation, research and development,
marketing, and organizational relevance? In short, the carrier's spirited
response to market competition tended to subvert a "paper" study that
held that static price comparisons provided a sufficient benchmark to
assess the economic performance of vertical affiliates.
Barriers to Competitive Entry
Third, independent equipment suppliers argue that despite superior
and lower-priced equipment, market entry is frustrated by the fact that
vertical operating companies continue to prefer to purchase in-house
equipment. Non-integrated suppliers insist that vertical integration acts
to foreclose market entry, thus artificially making price comparison
studies a substitute for genuine market competition. An FCC trial staff,
the FCC, or both, found evidence that
- vertical integration biased the make-buy decision to favor
the captive affiliate;"
- construction plans of the telephone utilities were given to
the captive supplier exclusively, excluding the outside sup-
plier;3"
- the operating telephone companies bought equipment from
28Id.
29ICL, Statement of the Trial Staff, pp. 87-89; Final Decision, pp. 52-53, 56.
30IL, Testimony of Manley R. Irwin (Trial Staff Exhibit 297), p. 66.
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the captive supplier without even a firm price in some
cases;
31
standards and information were provided by the utilities to
the captive supplier on a timely basis and released much
later to general trade suppliers;32
Western equipment was encouraged by AT&T to be placed
in the construction budgets of the various operating utilities
so that by definition they would purchase from the captive
supplier without even looking at outside manufacturers'
comparable equipment or prices.
33
The fact that vertical integration acted to limit the market access of
outside suppliers was affirmed by the FCC's trial staff, it was reaffirmed
by the FCC's final decision in its investigation of Bell System interrela-
tionships, has been documented in private litigation and judicial deci-
sions, and is currently alleged by ITT in an antitrust suit against the Bell
System.3 4 These actions add cogency to the argument that the outside
equipment suppliers serve largely as a short-run gap filler until the in-
tegrated firm "tools up." In sum, the actual market conduct of vertical
integration acts to negate the meaningfulness of theoretical price com-
parison studies submitted by telephone operating companies to
regulatory authorities.35
Methodological Infinnities
A fourth critique of the price comparison studies assaults the premise
of methodology. In this respect the FCC observed the following:
* First, some Western Electric equipment was reconfigured so
as to favor the equipment supplied by the captive supplier.36
* Second, some equipment was not technically comparable,
thus rendering suspect the premise of price comparison
studies.3 '
" Third, the general trade prices used were catalogue prices,
not actual or real prices which would be quoted only at the
"prospect of real business. ' 38
AT&T's License Contract
Finally, AT&T's license contract distorts the costs and prices of
Western Electric equipment, a distortion which further renders price
"Id, Statement of the Trial Staff, p. 89; Final Decision, Appendix A, p. 17.
32Id, Statement of the Trial Staff, pp. 12-13.
3Id., Statement of the Trial Staff, pp. 89-90.
3"nternational TeL and Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. and Elec. Corp., 351 F. Supp. 1153.
3International Tel. and TeL Corp. v. American Tel and TeL Co., 444 F. Supp. 1118
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
641 F.C.C. 2d 389, 430 (1973).
3'Id at 435.
1Id at 432-33.
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comparison studies tenuous. The license contract allows AT&T to bill the
23 Bell operating companies for a variety of services including, among
other things, marketing and fundamental research and development. To
the extent that Western's products do not include all marketing and R&D
expenditures, equipment prices are thereby understated.3 9
THE LEGACY OF MARKET STRUCTURE
When Congress debated the regulation of telephone companies in the
1930's, the procurement practices attendant vertical integration were ob-
viously of central concern. Buying practices raised questions concerning
reasonableness of a telephone company's rate base. An initial legislative
proposal recommended that mandatory competitive bidding be instituted
between vertical affiliates. The suggested act stated:
The Commission may require that all or any transaction of
the carriers involving the furnishing of equipment, supplies,
research services, finances, credit or personnel to such car-
riers by competitive bids on such terms and conditions and sub-
ject to such regulations as it shall prescribe as necessary in the
public interest.40
However, Bell resisted this proposed legislation. AT&T President
Gifford insisted that: "We regard this section as a dangerous extension
of regulated authority without precedent in the country and a radical
departure from all past practices and as an unwarranted invasion of the
rights of management. ' 41 Congress passed the final act which directed
the Commission to examine the transactions entered into by any common
carrier (supplies, research, services, and the like) and report back to Con-
gress if remedial legislation were deemed desirable.
An investigation in the 1930's did scrutinize the relationship between
Western Electric and the Bell operating companies and drew the conclu-
sion that regulation ought to be extended to the procurement process.
39
In CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION STAFF, REPORT ON THE AFFILIATED RELA-
TIONSHIPS OF THE PACIFIC TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY WITH BELL LABORATORIES,
INC.. AT&T GENERAL DEPARTMENTS, 195 BROADWAY CORPORATION, the staff of the Califor-
nia Public Utilities Commission found that the Bell System's current method of funding
research and development permits Western Electric to avoid the need to recover certain
R&D costs through its product prices. Thus, "under such circumstances, price com-
parisons between Western products and those of other telecommunications manufacturers
become meaningless. Since Western's prices are not reflective of the true economic cost of
its products and competitors' products could be very misleading (p. 2-22)."
In the cross examination of a Western Electric witness in FCC's Docket 19129, Phase II,
it was determined that marketing cross-subsidization can and does occur. Specifically,
Western's wholly-owned subsidiary, Teletype Corp., was the non-paying recipient of an
AT&T marketing study. Cross Examination of Guy Accettura, November 6, 1974,
Transcript 16019.
"Legislative proposal by the Federal Communications Commission at hearings on S.
2910 before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 73rd Congress, 2nd Session,
at 86 (1934).4jd.
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The initial report stated:
It is recommended, therefore, that Section 215 of the Com-
munications Act of 1934 be amended so as to give the Federal
Communications Commission complete power of review, ap-
proval or disapproval of all intercompany contracts including
those presently existing as well as those which may be ex-
ecuted in the future.42
Specifically, the original report in 1938 asked for authority to regulate
the cost and price of telephone equipment and apparatus and thus con-
vert Western Electric into a public utility. The report explained that:
Regulation of Western as a utility would involve, first, the in-
troduction of a modern and efficient cost-accounting system
whereby the actual cost of manufacture of each item or class of
product could be determined, and second, the fixing of
Western Electric prices for use in the determination of the rate
base of the Bell System operating companies at Western Elec-
tric cost to manufacture plus a reasonable return on the invest-
ment devoted to such manufacture. 43
Finally, the initial report stated that "[I]t is recommended that the Com-
munications Act of 1934 be amended so as to permit regulation of the
Western Electric Co. by the Federal Communications Commission as a
public utility in the manner described above."' 44 The Commission
eventually rejected the report and subsequently adopted a 1939 version
which did request legislation
specifically to authorize this Commission to prescribe basic
cost accounting methods to be followed by manufacturing
companies under contract with operating telephone companies
for the general supplying of materials or equipment and by
manufacturing companies subsidiary to or affiliated with
operating telephone companies through corporate structure. 45
Nevertheless, the Commission emphasized that such regulation need not
await the enactment of additional laws, a philosophy which began an era
known as "continuing surveillance."
In 1949 an antitrust complaint filed by the Department of Justice
accused Western Electric of monopolizing the telephone equipment
market.46 The complaint sought divestment of Western from AT&T,
separation of Western into three companies, and the injection of com-
petitive bidding into the procurement of telephone apparatus by the Bell
Operating Companies.
IIFCC, PROPOSED REPORT, TELEPHONE INVESTIGATION 703 (1938).
4'Id at 701.
411& at 702.
41FCC, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 19, at 601.
"United States v. Western Elec. Co., Civil No. 17-49 (D.N.J., Jan. 23, 1956).
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The antitrust suit, settled by consent decree in 1956, restricted Bell and
Western Electric to essentially regulated markets.47 In effect, telephone
company integration was sanctioned and equipment price comparison
studies took on a new dimension. Moreover, the consent decree meant
that vertical integration became the organizational model to be emulated
by the independent telephone companies.
In the 1970's a series of antitrust cases challenged the vertical relation-
ship of telephone company and manufacturers. The import and ramifica-
tions of these cases continue today. In 1972, for example, a district court
acting on a complaint filed by ITT ruled that vertically integrated
General Telephone & Electronics had achieved foreclosure of its
operating telephone company product market to the rest of the equip-
ment manufacturing industry.4s As the judge in this case stated: "The
underlying basis of GTE's plaint is that so long as the giant Bell is
allowed to remain vertically integrated, then it is simply 'not fair' to deny
like vertical integration to an independent pygmie. '49 Furthermore, the
judge held:
The record of GTE prior to the bringing of this suit, however,
makes it clear that in practice, regardless of such verbaliza-
tions, when an independent telephone company has been
acquired, all the independent manufacturers and suppliers,
save A.E. and Lenkurt, have thereafter found their sales to the
acquired company to have abruptly declined.50
The court took note of non-price problems associated with vertical in-
tegration. It observed that GTE resisted new switching gear because its
own equipment affiliates did not manufacture that equipment or that
hardware. This policy applied to at least pulse code modulation carrier
equipment, crossbar switching systems, and telephone handsets.5 A con-
flict developed, namely, that the in-house procurement may have
benefited GTE, but it did not necessarily redound to the wellbeing of
GTE's subscribers. In the ensuing consent decree, the emphasis was
primarily on corporate conduct rather than structural change.2
In 1974 the Department of Justice filed another complaint against
AT&T, arguing that vertical integration had resulted in foreclosure of the
market, and sought divestiture of Western Electric from the Bell System
as a necessary remedy.5 3 Again, the claim was that the market had been
47Consent Decree in United States v. Western Elec. Co., Civil No. 17-49 (D.N.J., Jan. 23,
1956).
'SInternational Tel. and Tel. Co. v. General Tel. and Elec. Corp., 351 F. Supp. 1153 (D.
Hawaii 1972).
OId at 1183.
10Id at 1188.
"Id at 1192-93.
52Consent Decree in International Tel. and Tel. Co. v. General Tel. and Elec. and
Hawaiian Tel., Civil No. 2754 (D. Hawaii, Dec. 20, 1978).
"United States v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., Civ. No. 17, (D.D.C. filed Nov. 1974).
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illiegally monopolized and effectively insulated, thereby hamstringing
,competition in telephone equipment manufacturing.
In 1977 the FCC ruled that Bell's vertical integration acted to limit and
foreclose innovation in the equipment market and that this, in turn, acted
to 'burden the telephone-subscribing public.5 4 In essence, the Commission
determined that equipment competition benefited the Bell System and
the integrated supplier. Such competition aided the telephone companies
because it enabled them to compare alternative hardware, introduced and
spurred new service features, generated cost savings, and permitted
telephone companies to be more responsive to customer needs. The Com-
mission further stated:
We also agree with the Trial Staff that increased equipment
competition, insofar as meeting the BOC's equipment needs is
concerned, is likely to benefit the general trade suppliers by
broadening the base for research and development and en-
hancing the opportunity for technological progress; and
benefit non-Bell telephone companies to the extent that any
benefits accruing generally from equipment competition will
redound to the benefit of Independent ratepayers also. The end
result is that competition affords ratepayers a wider range of
choices regarding communications equipment and services
which best meet their communications needs in terms of
quality and cost.55
Consequently, the Commission directed that the System assign
autonomy to Bell operating companies in the matter of equipment pur-
chases. AT&T was ordered to submit a proposal to achieve separation of
its equipment procurement and manuufacturing functions within the
framework of certain guidelines. Specifically, the Bell telephone com-
panies should have a centralized capability, removed from Western in-
fluence, for performing make-buy and procurement decisions, analyses of
competitive bids, purchasing, and inspection. It was the express intent of
the FCC to give the operating companies increased independence in pur-
chasing and product evaluation.5 6 AT&T recently responded with a pro-
posal that it create a separate subsidiary forthe purpose of providing
equitable access to the Bell telephone companies for both Western and
general trade products. This program is expected to be addressed by the
Commission in the near future.
Finally, ITT initiated an antitrust suit against AT&T, Western Elec-
tric, and Bell Telephone Laboratories in 1977. 51 ITT argues that AT&T
has pursued a deliberate policy of refusing to purchase telephone equip-
5164 F.C.C. 2d 55-56 (1977).
" k at 35-36.
"Id at 143-44, 149.
"
7International TeL and TeL Corp. v. American TeL and TeL Co., 444 F. Supp. 1148
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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ment from other suppliers, even when such equipment was proven to be
at least technically equal and lower in cost than comparable Western
Electric equipment. ITT alleges that the firm was blocked from selling its
equipment to Bell carriers because AT&T favored the more expensive in-
house (Western) hardware. In short, the company claims that in 1974,
Western Electric sold $230 million worth of channel banks to the Bell
System while ITT sold only $5.5 million to the Bell operating companies
despite the latter's belief that its equipment was superior and cheaper.
Similarly, structural changes are apparent in Canadian telecommunica-
tions. A report by the Canadian Department of Communications
reviewing the procurement practices of British Columbia Telephone
Company seemed to indicate that GTE-owned British Columbia had
tended to favor its own manufacturing affiliates. 58 Although the report
suggested that there was little indication that prices billed to BC
telephone company were excessive, the report argued that the critical
issue involved switching technology and the lag of equipment introduc-
tion. Specifically, British Columbia was criticized for allowing its central
office equipment to fall behind new generations of switching and hard-
ware. The report thus concluded that BC's manufacturing capability did
not have the proper equipment to enable it to serve its operating
telephone companies and "therefore it is imperative that in the future BC
Tel.'s management be entirely free from any influence exercised by its
manufacturing affiliates in its planning and procurement decisions."5 9
More recently, Canada's Consumer and Corporate Affairs completed an
investigative study of Northern Telecom and Bell Canada's vertical rela-
tionship.60 The report, critical of price comparison studies of equipment
manufacturers, argued that such a standard is not an effective proxy to
measure the relative performance of Northern because: 1) manufacturing
cost functions vary because of the wide range in firm size; 2) the firms
lack the homogeneity necessary for price comparisons; and 3) there is
necessarily an arbitrary allocation of joint costs. 61 The report recom-
mended a vertical spinoff, i.e., severing all financial ties between Bell
Canada and Northern Telecom, and the institution of competitive
bidding in the securing of hardware and equipment for Bell Canada.
62
To sum up, the structural legacy of regulation reveals one thread of
continuity. A market structure in which a telephone company holds
ownership in a captive manufacturer is for all practical purposes a closed
"
8GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS, REVIEW OF THE PROCURE-
MENT PRACTICES AND POLICIES AND THE INTERCORPORATE FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIPS OF THE
BRITISH COLUMBIA TELEPHONE COMPANY (1975).
DIRECTOR OF INVESTIGATION AND RESEARCH. COMBINES INVESTIGATION ACT; THE EFFECTS
OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION ON THE TELECOMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT MARKET IN CANADA
(1976).
lId. at 98.
Id at 182-94.
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market. Under this market structure the conduct of the vertical utility is
predictable. Telephone companies secure the bulk of their equipment via
in-house suppliers. In the absence of competitive bidding, outside sup-
pliers are essentially placed at an economic disadvantage. Vertical af-
filiates can often experience short-falls in performance to the extent that
prices may be exorbitant, innovation may lag, and equipment features
may be found wanting. Such performance impacts the carrier rate base
and obviously affects the telephone ratepayers.
What has been witnessed recently is a search by public policy for a cure
for these performance deficiencies at the federal level. Not surprisingly,
that search does not include a resurrection of price comparison studies.
Instead, public policy finds itself increasingly re-examining market struc-
ture as the explanation for market conduct and market performance. If
that search appears surprising to many students of regulation, it is
because commissions are finding themselves frustrated in their attempts
to evaluate the prudence of telephone company investment.
CONCLUSION
Since the early court decisions of the 1920's and the 1930's, equipment
price studies have served as one regulatory test for investment rate base
prudence. These price analyses have been sponsored, funded, and pro-
moted by companies themselves. At the same time, public policymakers
have witnessed a legacy of structural reassessment of vertical integra-
tion as that structure impacts economic efficiency and performance.
These actions trace their origin to the first part of the 1900's and have
surfaced today in terms of antitrust complaints and/or consent decrees.
In particular, regulatory policy in both the U.S. and Canada in the 1960's
and 1970's has found itself concerned with structural issues of the
telephone industry.
It must be noted, however, that the evolution of U.S. policy has
focused at the federal level. What does the demise of the price comparison
study hold for state regulatory agencies? A first reaction is that of all the
problems besetting state commissions, vertically integrated telephone
companies is hardly an issue of burning consequence. Obviously, price
comparisons have assumed away a potentially controversial and complex
regulatory problem.
On the other hand, state commissions ignore at their peril the
technological and market changes taking place in telecommunications.
Blindly accepting "paper" studies will hardly guarantee that state
regulatory agencies will be able to address matters of rate base evalua-
tion with any degree of success. 63
'
3An examination of public utility rate cases during the latter part of 1976 and all of 1977
failed to reveal any rejection of equipment price comparisons as a legitimate rate base con-
cept. Frequently, such analyses were not even mentioned in commission decisions on the
telephone rate increase requests. In at least three rate cases (involving Kansas,
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A corollary observation is that state commissions, not unlike the FCC,
will find themselves searching for an alternative benchmark to company-
sponsored price comparison studies. The nature and content of these
alternatives is as yet unclear. But competitive pressures are not receding
in the industry. On the contrary, state commissions now find themselves
intimately involved with questions of customer ownership of terminal
equipment that challenge long standing leasing policies of integrated
telephone carriers.
The FCC has been buffeted by a series of technological and economic
forces which erode the premise and validity of price comparison studies.
Will not these same forces assault state regulation, and will not state
regulators find themselves confronted with the complexities of rate base
evaluation attendant vertical integration?
In a real sense, state regulation stands at a crossroad. The public policy
question is no longer whether the 1922 Houston case can be resurrected
and rendered valid in the decade ahead. Rather, the question is whether
regulation at the state level can anticipate the future through re-
examination of policy alternatives that accommodate and respond to
technological and market realities.
Maryland,and Wisconsin) no finding was apparently made despite the submission of price
studies by the telephone company. The prices of affiliated manufacturers were either fjund
to be reasonable or were not found to be unreasonable in at least one instance in several
jurisdictions (the District of Columbia, Minnesota, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, and West Virginia). Three or more states (Michigan, New York, North Carolina)
on at least one occasion expressed concern with the specific price comparisons at hand but
did not reject the institution as a valid regulatory tool An interesting development is the
aforementioned August, 1977, report by the staff of the California Public Utility Commis-
sion which deemed AT&T's price comparison studies to be "meaningless" due to the
perceived failure of Western Electric's prices to reflect all R&D costs (see note 39 supra).
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